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THE CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION AS
SELF-SERVING INTERMEDDLER
By JOHN D. MCCAMUS*
The prospects of restitutionary recovery for individuals characterized as
"self-serving intermeddlers" have been examined on a previous occasion in
this Journal.' The decision of Mr. Justice Garrett in Mechanical Contractors
Association v. J. G. Rivard Ltd.2 provides an interesting illustration of such
recovery and suggests that the unjust enrichment principle may offer a
useful solution to a "free-rider" problem arising in the context of the labour
relations law of the construction industry. In Rivard, a self-serving inter-
meddler was held to be entitled to quantum meruit compensation for the
value of certain services which it had rendered. Although the reasons for
judgment of Garrett J. appear to suggest that liability was imposed on the
basis of an implied contract of some kind, it will be argued here that the
proper basis for imposing liability rests on the unjust enrichment principle.
The self-serving intermeddler in Rivard was a contractors' association seek-
ing a contribution to the costs of maintaining the organization from a recalci-
trant contractor on the theory that the contractor had derived benefit from
its activities. The funding of such organizations has been a problem in the
past.3 In Rivard, Garrett J. held that non-members of the Association could
be required to contribute a fair proportion of the cost of collective bargaining
undertaken by the Association. If the analysis set forth here offers the correct
explanation for the result in Rivard, this decision could provide a general
solution to the financing problems of employers' organizations.
The identifying characteristics of "self-serving intermeddlers" may not
be immediately apparent to the reader. This term of art, apparently coined by
@ Copyright, 1980, John D. McCamus.
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the helpful comments of Professor H. W. Arthurs on an earlier draft.
1 McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and the Law of Restitution (1978), 16
Osgoode Hall L.J. 515.
2 (1977), 21 O.R. (2d) 397, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 585 (H.C.). An appeal from this
decision was dismissed as an abandoned appeal on April 25, 1978.
3 See Ellis, Electrical Power Systems Sector Enquiry Report (unpublished report of
an Industrial Inquiry Comm'n., Jan. 31, 1978) at 5-25.
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Professor Dawson,4 refers to individuals who have carried out a course of
action essentially in their own self-interest and in so doing have generated
incidental or "spin-off" benefits for other parties. In the typical case, the
spin-off benefit has not been requested or sought after by the ultimate reci-
pient. Illustrations of this phenomenon examined in the previous article were:
the making of improvements to land by owners with resulting benefit to
neighbours or co-owners; the creation of incidental benefits for third parties
through the performance of contracts, as where a sub-contractor confers a
benefit on the owner of land by performing his agreement with the contrac-
tors; the payment of another's debt by one who does so in order to protect
his own credit position; and finally, the prosecution of lawsuits which enure
to the benefit of others, as where a creditor recaptures assets of the debtor
with consequent benefit to other creditors or where an individual successfully
litigates a representative claim with resulting benefit to inactive members of
the represented class. The general thesis advanced in the article was that
claims for recovery against the "free-riders" for the value of benefits received
could be supported on the basis of general principles of the law of restitution
and that, indeed, the restitutionary interests of the self-serving intermeddler
are recognized and protected by a number of well-established rules of law.
It has long been accepted, for example, that a creditor who has recaptured
an asset of the debtor to the general benefit of all creditors can require the
others to contribute to the costs of the successful lawsuit.5
The self-serving intermeddler cases provide an illuminating context within
which to test the utility of the unjust enrichment analysis as a theory of
liability which can explain the results of decided cases which are otherwise
difficult to ground in a recognizable theory of liability and, further, offer
guidance with respect to as yet uncharted areas of the law. It is an illuminat-
ing context for two reasons. First, although these cases give rise to a number
of analytical difficulties, their results do conform significantly with the result
which would be dictated by an application of the unjust enrichment principle.
If these cases are properly characterized as unjust enrichment problems,8
restitutionary principles can be useful in identifying anomalous results in the
decided cases and in providing an analytical framework for assessing the
merits of claims brought in novel circumstances. Secondly, as was suggested
4 See Dawson, The Self Serving Intermeddler (1974), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1409.
G See, e.g., Tootal v. Spicer (1831), 4 Sim. 510, 58 E.R. 191; Macdonald v. McCall
(1887), 12 P.R. 9 (Ont.); and additional authorities cited in McCamus, supra note 1,
at 559-63.
6 They are explicitly so characterized in much American case law. The fact that
the flowering of the unjust enrichment doctrine is more recent in Canada is the explana-
tion, presumably, for the fact that Canadian cases on these issues do not speak the
language of unjust enrichment. The absence of explicit unjust enrichment language in
the case law does not, of course, mean that these cases ought not be characterized
as restitutionary. If the unjust enrichment principle offers a sound theoretical basis for
the results in the decided case law, it will be useful to so categorize the cases and to
analyze the problems raised in them and in similar fact situations in restitutionary terms.
On the significance of explicit judicial recognition of the underlying principles of analyti-
cal framework of a "subject" area of the law, see Samek, Unjust Enrichment, Quasi-
Contract and Restitution (1969), 47 Can. B. Rev. 1.
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in the earlier article, the self-serving intermeddler cases operate at the outer
limits of the reach of restitutionary analysis. They are for the law of restitu-
tion what the negligent misstatement cases are for the laws of tort and con-
tract-an opportunity to examine basic principles of liability in a way which
may shape our understanding of their operation in more familiar terrain.
More particularly, the general principle of restitutionary liability is that one
who has unofficiously conferred a benefit on another is entitled to restitution
therefor.7 The self-serving intermeddler cases provoke careful consideration
of the content of the two central concepts of 'officiousness' and 'benefit.' 8 As
far as "officiousness" is concerned, an examination of the cases supports the
view that the mere fact that one has acted out of self-interest does not render
the conduct 'officious.' True officiousness appears to involve opportunistic,
malicious or frivolous intervention in another's affairs. Interventions which
are the incidental result of pursuing one's own best interests do not consti-
tute, in the language of the American Restatement,9 "interference in the affairs
of another not justified by the circumstances." Proper refinement of the 'bene-
fit' concept is a more difficult matter and is, perhaps, of more general
significance for the law of restitution. The benefits conferred in these cases
have not been requested by their recipients. Accordingly, there is some room
for dispute as to whether the benefit in question is one which the recipient
can fairly be required to pay for. Where, as in Rivard, the benefit takes the
form of services, the imposition of liability in effect forces the recipient to
make an investment in the acquisition of something he may not have needed
or desired for any reason. The determination of the range of situations in
which it is appropriate to award restitution for the value of unrequested
services has proved to be a difficult and somewhat contentious matter. The
self-serving intermeddler cases do lend some support, however, to the pro-
position that unrequested services should be considered to constitute a benefit
for which restitutionary compensation is appropriate where the services are
necessary in some sense and therefore constitute an unavoidable expense for
the recipient or where the benefit has been transformed into a financial gain
or has, in some other way, been turned to account. In these cases the recipi-
ent's freedom to invest his own assets as he sees fit is not unfairly circum-
scribed by the unjust enrichment principle.
In Rivard these issues surface in the context of the collective bargaining
scheme established under the Ontario Labour Relations Act for the construc-
tion industry.10 Under the Act, contractors' associations may seek formal
accreditation by the Ontario Labour Relations Board as bargaining agents
7 See generally Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (2d ed. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1978) at 11-25.
8 For a more extended treatment of these questions, see McCamus, supra note 1, at
518-22.
9 Am. Law Inst., Restatement of the Law of Restitution (St. Paul: Am. Law Inst.,
1937) at 15.
10 The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, ss. 106-24, as am. by S.O. 1975,
c. 76, ss. 29-34, S.O. 1977, c. 31, s. 3, and S.O. 1979, c. 113.
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for all employers1' within a specified geographical area for the purpose of
engaging in collective bargaining with construction industry trade unions.
Employers within the geographical area are bound by a collective agreement
entered into by an accredited association, at least in the sense that the agree-
ment will govern the employer's relationship with any member of the union
in question that it employs.' 2 This is so whether or not the employer has
chosen to become a member of the accredited association. In restitutionary
terms, then, the neat point that arose in Rivard was whether the Association
had unofficiously conferred a benefit on a non-member contractor by engag-
ing in a collective bargaining relationship with the union and, accordingly,
that a share of the Association's bargaining costs should be recoverable in
order to prevent an unjust enrichment of the contractor.
Accreditation schemes of this kind have been enacted by provincial gov-
ernments in Canada in response to contractor lobbying for the explicit and
well understood purpose of enhancing the collective bargaining strength of
contractors."3 The pre-existing practice of separate bargaining by employers
was widely thought to create a serious imbalance in the relative bargaining
power of contractors and unions. Contractors bargaining individually pro-
vided ample scope for the mounting of a divide and conquer strategy by the
unions. Generous agreements could be extracted from vulnerable employers
and used as a basis for demanding similar settlements in subsequent negotia-
tions with other contractors. This feature of collective bargaining within the
industry may have been a contributing factor in the dramatic wage spiral
experienced by the industry in the early 1970's.14 Although attempts at col-
lective action through contractors' associations had become a familiar feature
of bargaining within the industry, the failure of significant numbers of em-
ployers to participate in such organizations diminished their effectiveness.
Accreditation schemes had as a central objective, then, the strengthening of
the bargaining power of the contractors by facilitating the deployment of a
collective strategy. Under the Ontario scheme, an employers' association may
be accredited only if it enjoys majority support amongst affected contrac-
tors.' 5 Once accredited, the association has exclusive bargaining rights for all
11 Id., s. 106(c) defines the term "employer" so as to include only those with respect
to whose employees a trade union has bargaining rights.
12 Id., s. 117.
Is See generally Dorsey, Accreditation in Construction Labour Relations (Halifax:
Inst. Publ. Aff., Dal. Univ., 1973), ch. 1. The initial proposal from which these schemes
evolved was set forth in Arthurs and Crispo, "Countervailing Employer Power: Accredi-
tation of Contractor Associations," in Goldenberg and Crispo, eds., Construction Labour
Relations (Toronto: Can. Constr. Ass'n., 1968) 376. For a recent and useful review of
Canadian developments, see Brown, The Reform of Bargaining Structure in the Cana-
dian Construction Industry (1977), 3 Ind. Rel. L.J. 539.
14 Although wage spirals were not the exclusive preserve of the construction indus-
try in this period, the spiral in this industry exceeded those elsewhere. See Econ. Council
of Can., Toward More Stable Growth in Construction (Ottawa: Econ. Council of Can.,
1973) s-12, s-13.
15 The nature of the majority required for accreditation is a numerical majority of
employers, provided that they collectively employ a majority of employees employed
by employers within the unit. See supra note 10, s. 115.
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contractors within the unit represented by the association, whether or not
they are members of the association. Non-member contractors cannot bargain
separately with a trade union. The association is under a statutory duty,
however, to fairly represent the interests of both members and non-members
in carrying out its mandate. 16
The plaintiff contractors association had been established in 1966. Al-
though the defendant, . G. Rivard Ltd., was originally a member of the
Association, Rivard had resigned its membership in 1967, some six years
before the Association successfully sought accreditation under the Act. The
plaintiff was accredited by the Board on February 22, 1973 and in March of
1973 it entered into a collective agreement with "Local 71, Plumbers and
Sheet Metal Workers of Ottawa" which was binding on all contractors in the
Ottawa area, Rivard included. The Association had negotiated collective
agreements with Local 71 prior to accreditation in 1968 and 1971. For its
part, Rivard had negotiated its own collective agreement with Local 71 in
1968 but in 1971 it had in some manner, according to Garrett J., permitted
the plaintiff to "negotiate or to assist in negotiating"' 1 a new agreement.
Rivard agreed that the Association could negotiate on its behalf in 1973 but
stipulated that the terms of the agreement were to be made known to the
defendant before it was actually signed.
The Association had attempted to secure its financing by means of pro-
visions included in its corporate by-laws and in the collective agreements it had
entered into with Local 71. Members of the Association were required under
a corporate by-law (No. 25) to contribute to a so-called industry fund in
accord with a formula set forth in a corporate regulation. In an obvious
attempt to extract a similar contribution from contractors who are not mem-
bers of the Association, the Association had also bargained to include a
clause repeating this formula in the following terms in each of the 1968, 1971
and 1973 collective agreements with Local 71:
Each employer will contribute 5V for every hour worked by a journeyman or
apprentice under this agreement. This contribution will be paid by the 15th of
each month to the Mechanical Contractors Association of Ottawa in accordance
with its By-Law 25 and will be paid through the appointed Trustees or their
Administrator.18
Although the insertion of such clauses is apparently a widespread practice in
construction labour relations, it may be noted that this device has some unat-
tractive features both from the point of view of the employers' associations and
from the perspective of non-members such as Rivard.
First, while it is understandable that an association might adopt this
device as the best possible stratagem for inducing contributions from non-
members, it does have the effect of placing the adequacy of association fund-
ing on the bargaining table in each negotiation. Although it would be possible
16 Id., s. 120.
17 Supra note 2, at 401 (O.R.), 589 (D.L.R.).
I8 Id. at 399 (O.R.), 487 (D.L.R.).
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for the association to extract larger contributions from its own membership
than it would be able to negotiate as a term of the collective agreement, this
is not a policy which would be likely to swell the membership rolls of the
association. Why join the association if this would involve paying a higher
level of contribution to the costs of collective bargaining? Secondly, from the
non-members' point of view, the device is unattractive insofar as it seeks to ex-
tract from them an amount representing more than a fair proportion of collec-
tive bargaining costs as opposed to the other costs of the association. Thus there
was evidence in Rivard that the "industry fund" set up by the plaintiff in its
by-laws was used for social, educational, informational and other purposes
approved in the by-laws quite apart from its use in financing the Association's
collective bargaining effort. The portion of the Association's budget allocated
to labour relations activities was said to be 33.18 percent. 19 Moreover, the
formula appeared to be yielding a sum in excess of what Garrett J. perceived
to be the Association's immediate needs. At the end of December 1976, the
Association had accumulated assets, most of which were cash, of $137,000.
To comply with the industry fund clause would require Rivard to make a
donation to the funding of activities from which it derived no benefit what-
soever. Garrett J. was evidently quite offended by this feature of the industry
fund scheme. To place a clause of this kind in the collective agreement was,
in his view, both deceptive and unfair: "[I]t would have been more honest
and forthright on the part of the plaintiff to have simply [sic] advised its
members and non-members for whom it was negotiating that certain fees
were going to be charged by it. .. '* Whether this stricture is entirely war-
ranted is doubtful. The insertion of such terms in the collective agreement
may well be a lawful exercise of the parties' capacity to settle the terms and
conditions of employment.21 In any event, it is clear that Rivard was not
taken in. Both prior to and subsequent to accreditation, Rivard refused all
overtures from the plaintiff to make a contribution to the industry fund either
at the full formula rate or at lesser rates suggested by the plaintiff in an
attempt to reach a compromise.
Having failed to persuade Rivard to make a contribution, the Associa-
tion sought legal redress. Prior to undertaking the lawsuit under discussion,
the Association had unsuccessfully pursued grievances against Rivard before
the Joint Conference Board (the decision of which was approved on review
by the Divisional Court) and the Ontario Labour Relations Board.22 Al-
10 Id. at 400 (O.R.), 589 (D.L.R.).
20 Id. at 400 (O.R.), 587-88 (D.L.R.).
21 Syndicat Catholique des Employes de Magasins de Que., Inc. v. Compagnie
Paquet Le., [1959] S.C.R. 206, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346, 1 C.L.L.C. 15,409. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that a term requiring compulsory check-off of union dues from
the wages of employees not belonging to the union could be lawfully included as a
"condition of employment" in a "collective agreement" as defined in the Quebec Labour
Relations Act. Reasoning by analogy, it appears to be lawful for the parties to agree
that employers who employ union labour must contribute to the cost of running the
employers association.
22 See Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. 1. G. Rivard Ltd., [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep.
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though the precise nature of these proceedings is not indicated in Garrett J.'s
judgment, it is clear that in both instances they constituted attempts to re-
quire compliance with the industry fund provision of the collective agree-
ments. The grievance before the Joint Conference Board was brought under
the 1973 collective agreement and failed because that agreement did not, in
its own terms, provide for the initiation of grievances by the Association. 2
This oversight was remedied in the 1975 agreement under which the griev-
ance before the O.L.R.B. was launched. The Board dismissed the Associa-
tion's grievance on the basis that the Board's grievance jurisdiction extended
only to grievances between the two "parties" to the agreement-the Associa-
tion (or an employer or group of employers) on the one hand and the union
on the other. Although the Act does render collective agreements (including,
arguably, industry fund provisions) "binding" on all employers represented
by an association,24 there appears to be no effective mechanism established
by the Act for the enforcement by employers' associations of obligations un-
der such agreements on non-member employers. Nor does there appear to
be any civil remedy available for enforcement of such provisions per se.
Garrett J. was certainly of the view that these arrangements could not avail
the Association: "The plaintiff obviously cannot rely upon the collective bar-
gaining agreement as an agreement by the defendant or anyone in the de-
fendant's position to contribute to the industry fund in that the collective
bargaining agreement is not made between the plaintiff and the defendant
but between the plaintiff for the mechanical contractors and Local 71 ."26
Quite apart from this privity concern, however, there are statutory obstacles
to civil enforcement which appear to be insurmountable. 26
The action before Garrett J. was brought for the recovery of $11,814.08
in industry fund contributions allegedly due from the defendant.27 The plain-
tiff offered two different theories in support of the claim, one in contract, the
other in quantum meruit. The contract claim was disposed of with little
difficulty. The reasons for judgment do not indicate the nature of the agree-
ment alleged by the plaintiff. Presumably, the plaintiff asserted that a direct
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to make such contributions
could be implied in the circumstances of this case. In Garrett J.'s view, how-
ever, there was no support whatsoever in the evidence for the existence of an
agreement "written, verbal or otherwise between the plaintiff as to payment
of the industry fund charges." 28 The plaintiff could not have entertained
23 These proceedings are briefly described in the later decision of the O.L.R.B., id.
at 543.
24 The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 117.
25 Supra note 2. at 399 (O.R.), 587 (D.L.R.).
26 The Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 416, s. 3(3) appears to preclude such
relief. Further, s. 117 of The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, only stipulates
that the Agreement is binding on non-member employers "for the purposes of this Act"
and therefore not, semble, for the purposes of civil liability.
27 Although Garret J. does not clearly so indicate, the amount claimed probably
represents contributions to the fund for the entire period from negotiation of the 1968
agreement through to the expiry of the 1973 agreement in 1975,
28 Supra note 2, at 401 (O.R.), 589 (D.L.R.).
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serious doubt about Rivard's intentions with respect to industry fund con-
tributions: "The plaintiff well knew at all times that the defendant did not
agree to pay such charges.. .."2
Garrett J. then turned to a consideration of the quantum meruit claim.
Clearly, no claim could be asserted with respect to the 1968 negotiations.
Rivard had negotiated its own agreement with Local 71. A quantum meruit
award would be appropriate for the 1971 and 1973 negotiations, in Garrett
J.'s opinion, inasmuch as the defendant "probably by its conduct did permit
the plaintiff to negotiate or to assist in negotiating the collective agreements
for those two years."0 Although the significance of this acquiescence of the
defendant in permitting the plaintiff to negotiate on its behalf is not spelled
out precisely in Garrett J.'s reasons, it appears to be relied upon as a basis
for inferring a promise to pay for the services rendered. Garrett J. character-
ized quantum meruit claims in the following terms:
A quantum meruit claim arises where work is done or services are performed by
one person for another in circumstances which entitle the person doing the work
or performing the services to receive a reasonable compensation therefor. Where
no particular remuneration has been specified the law will infer a promise to pay
a reasonable sum.Al
As in so much of the quantum meruit case law, the inherent ambiguity of
the concept of "inferring" a promise is not clearly resolved in Garrett J.'s
judgment. One may, of course, infer genuine or actual agreement from a
particular set of circumstances. This does not appear to be what Garrett J.
has in mind. The plaintiff's suggestion that there exists an agreement between
the parties has already been rejected without hesitation. One may assume,
therefore, that the inference of a promise is intended by Garrett J. as a mere
fiction. An obligation is being imposed on the defendant-an obligation now
generally referred to as restitutionary in nature-to pay for the services ren-
dered by the plaintiff. To be sure, the fact that the defendant had acquiesced
in the receipt of these services seems to have been an important factor for
Garrett J. Acquiescence in the receipt of the services rendered does make it
seem more just to require the defendant to pay for them. But the obligation
to pay is imposed by Garrett J. on grounds of fairness rather than on the
basis that the defendant could be said to have promised to pay for them.
In focussing on Rivard's acquiescence as a basis for imposing an obliga-
tion to pay, Garrett I. appears to invoke a well-established principle of the
law of restitution to the effect that one who has "freely accepted" the benefit
of services rendered is obliged to pay for them. Indeed, the free acceptance
principle is the only conceivable explanation for the result in this case other
than the view, advocated here, that the Rivard case is an illustration of
the phenomenon of awarding restitutionary relief to self-serving intermed-
29 Id.
80 Id. Garrett I. did not believe that a sufficient factual basis had been established
in the record to enable calculation of an appropriate amount. The plaintiff was per-
mitted to take a reference to the Local Master for this purpose.
31 Id.
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dlers who have generated spin-off benefits for third parties. To sustain this
latter view, then, it is necessary to establish that the free acceptance principle
cannot supply an explanation for the result in Rivard.
The free acceptance principle does frequently offer an explanation for
the awarding of quantum meruit relief on the basis of the unjust enrichment
principle. The essence of the principle, however, is that the benefit of services
has been freely accepted in the knowledge that compensation is expected.32 It
would be unjust to allow a recipient of beneficial services to escape liability
when he has permitted or encouraged the provider of the services to incur
the cost of their provision in the expectation that he would be remunerated
for them. In the important Canadian authority on unjust enrichment, DegIman
v. Guaranty Trust,33 a nephew rendered certain personal services to his aunt
under an agreement which was void for lack of formality. Hence, the nephew
was not entitled to compensation in the agreed amount. The nephew was,
however, entitled to quantum meruit relief. The aunt had freely accepted
these services, knowing that the nephew expected remuneration for them.
Services accepted on such a basis give rise to restitutionary duties so as to
prevent the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another. On
reflection, it becomes evident that this principle cannot assist the plaintiff
in the Rivard case.
A critical element in the establishment of a cause of action on free
acceptance grounds is the knowledge of the recipient that the services are to
be paid for. It would be a complete answer to a claim premised on free
acceptance to show that the defendant's view that compensation should not
be paid was known to the plaintiff. This, of course, is the case in Rivard:
"The plaintiff well knew at all times that the defendant did not agree to pay
charges. .. .134 It was for this reason that Garrett J. easily dismissed the
suggestion that liability could be imposed on contractual grounds. For the
same reason, liability on the basis of free acceptance cannot stand. The ir-
relevance for liability purposes of Rivard's acquiescence in the role of the
Association in negotiating the 1971 and 1973 agreements becomes all the
more apparent if the context within which that acquiescence was apparently
sought and obtained by the Association is examined. The Association was
quite obviously not simply offering, in a disinterested manner, to act on
behalf of Rivard in its negotiations with Local 71. It is very much in the
interest of such employers' organizations to represent all of the employers
with whom the union in question would otherwise bargain individually.
Hence, the obvious virtue of accreditation schemes for employers. Prior to
March of 1973, of course, the plaintiff association was not accredited. It does
not require much reading between the lines of the brief factual glimpses
offered in Garrett J.'s judgment to appreciate that the acquiscence attributed
to Rivard must have arisen in the context of overtures from the Association
3 2 See, e.g., Goff and Jones, supra note 7, at 15-16, for an account of this principle.
33 [1954] S.C.R. 725, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785.
34 Supra note 2, at 401 (O.R.), 589 (D.L.R.).
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to let it include Rivard in the group for which it negotiated with Local 71.
The Association wanted Rivard "on side." Thus Rivard's acquiescence in
1973 (prior to accreditation, it may be assumed) appears to have been
somewhat grudging. Rivard allowed the Association to negotiate on its behalf
in 1973 but only if Rivard could see the agreement before it was signed.
Rivard would agree to throw in its lot with (and thereby strengthen) the
Association's bargaining position but only if some ability to oversee the final
product was offered in return. When viewed against the background of
Rivard's continuing insistence that it would not contribute to the industry
fund, it becomes apparent that Rivard's acquiescence in the bargaining role
of the Association cannot serve as a foundation for restitutionary liability.
Rivard's conduct does not constitute a free acceptance of services in the
expectation that they are to be paid for. It is the reluctant acquiescence of
one who relinquishes lone wolf status in favour of what others perceive to
be the common good to be achieved by collective action but persists in refusing
to contribute financially to its support.
If the free acceptance principle cannot provide a basis for restitutionary
relief, is there an alternative basis for requiring Rivard to render restitution-
ary compensation for what would otherwise be a free ride in the collective
agreement negotiations? Returning to the central theme of the modem analy-
sis of restitutionary liability-unofficious conferral of a benefit-a strong
argument can be made for recovery on the Rivard facts. On the qfuestion of
officiousness, support may be drawn from the self-serving intermeddler case
law. The plaintiff association, like an individual launching a creditors' suit
or undertaking carriage of a class action, is generating spin-off benefits
for Rivard in the course of pursuing its self interest or, more precisely, that
of its membership. It is to be noted, however, that the Association is not
merely conducting its own affairs with necessarily incidental spin-offs there-
by created for the defendant. The Association is going a step further and
actually acting as a representative of the defendant's interests. Moreover,
it wishes to act in the representative capacity in order to strengthen its
own bargaining position. If this were to be done without Rivard's consent,
would this not amount to an officious intermeddling in Rivard's affairs? In
responding to this objection, it is important to note that the representative
role played by the Association is, after accreditation at least, specifically
authorized by statute. Surely, the fact that the Association has been duly
authorized pursuant to the provisions of a statutory scheme by the Ontario
Labour Relations Board to act on behalf of employers such as Rivard is a
complete answer to an allegation of officiousness. The Association has not
engaged in an unjustified interference in the affairs of another. The enactment
of the accreditation scheme was designed to facilitate interventions of this
kind. With respect to the 1971 negotiations, however, the lack of accredita-
tion deprives the Association of this line of analysis. Further, for reasons
already discussed, the acquiescence of Rivard in 1971 cannot support a resti-
tutionary claim. Although the acquiescence would establish lack of officious-
ness, it occurred in circumstances which clearly indicated that Rivard did not
intend to pay for the Association's efforts on his behalf. It is to be noted, how-
ever, that Rivard's acquiescence is not material to the claim for the 1973 nego-
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tiations. The unofficious character of the actions of the Association in 1973 is
established on the basis of accreditation and is not dependent on the (other-
wise claim defeating) acquiescence of Rivard.
If it is conceded that the intervention is unofficious, is it also the case
that Rivard has received a benefit of a kind for which a duty to pay is nor-
mally imposed by restitutionary law? It is one thing to establish that the
collective bargaining services of an accredited contractors' association are
beneficial, in a general way, to the interests of the represented contractors;30
quite another to determine that non-member contractors should be obliged
to pay for benefits received in this form. Can Rivard not argue that it would
prefer not to obtain the benefit of services thus thrust upon it? Moreover,
how is the value of this benefit to Rivard to be assessed? An appropriate
response to both of these objections is suggested by the prevailing practice
in the industry of requiring contributions prorated to the extent of a particu-
lar employer's use of union employees.
The first objection draws on a concern with what was referred to in
the earlier article as the problem of free choice.30 It would be surprising
and most unusual for a recipient of unrequested services to be required to
pay for them unless (i) they could be said to have been necessary services
thus constituting an expense the recipient would have borne in any event,
or (ii) they have been turned to account by the recipient as, for ex-
ample, where their product has been converted into a liquid asset. If the
beneficial services do not meet these criteria, it may be argued that the im-
position of liability interferes with the ability of the individual to invest his
assets as he sees fit: "One cleans another's shoes. What can the other do but
put them on?"37 The problem here is only partly one of officiousness. We do
not want to reward the uninvited shoe cleaner who seeks to profit by intrud-
ing in another's affairs. We also do not want to force an individual who is
just as happy with dirty shoes to invest in their cleaning. Would Rivard's
freedom of choice be unjustly invaded by the imposition of a duty to con-
tribute to the cost of collective bargaining? In formulating a response to this
question, it is important to note whether Rivard freely agreed to employ
union labour or did so as a matter of necessity. If Rivard was free to choose
whether or not to employ members of Local 71, his decision to do so can
be fairly characterized as an affirmative decision to take advantage of the
services rendered by the Association. The efforts of the Association created,
in effect, a "product" or "asset" which was accessible to Rivard and could
be utilized by it in order to carry out profit-making activity.38 Once Rivard
35 If Rivard could establish that the collective bargaining activities of the associa-
tion were not beneficial to Rivard, this would be a complete answer to any claim on
unjust enrichment grounds.
36 McCamus, supra note 1, at 519-20.
37 Taylor v. Laird (1856), 1 H. & N. 266, 156 E.R. 1203, 25 L.J. Ex. 329 at 332
(this particular quotation is not included in the H. & N. or E.R.) per Pollock C.B.
38 Cf. Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 80 Me. 500, 15 A. 65 (1888). Discussed in McCamus,
supra note 1, at 524-25.
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has elected to do so, it does not offend the principle of free choice to require
payment for the true cost. The non-liquid benefits of the representational
activities of the Association have been turned to account by the decision of
Rivard to use union labour in carrying out its revenue-generating activities.
It is much more likely to have been the case, however, that non-union labour
was effectively unavailable as an alternative for Rivard.39 This fact would not
weaken the argument for recovery by the Association. On the contrary, this
would establish that the cost of collective bargaining was one which was
inevitable for Rivard if it was to carry on in the construction business and,
therefore, constitutes a benefit which should be the subject of restitutionary
relief. To carry what would otherwise be an unavoidable expense of the other
party is to confer an unequivocal benefit.
The industry fund arrangements are of particular significance in re-
sponding to the second objection adverted to above-the problem of quanti-
fying the value of the benefit conferred. The quantification problem presents
two dimensions here-to what extent has Rivard benefitted from these activi-
ties of the Association and what valuation should be placed on such benefits?
The industry fund provisions are evidently accepted within the industry as an
appropriate measure of the extent to which a particular employer has enjoyed
the benefits of the collective bargaining process. Accordingly, this approach
appears to offer a method of measuring the extent of the benefit derived for res-
titutionary purposes. The valuation of the benefit should be linked to the costs
borne by the Association. This is not the case of a service being marketed by the
Association for a fee. Clearly, however, non-members ought not be required
to contribute to the cost of Association activities from which they derive no
benefit. Accordingly, the pro-rated contribution should be discounted so as to
reflect only a share of the cost of the Association's collective bargaining
activities.
The availability of a workable measure of the value of the benefit re-
ceived may serve to distinguish the Rivard facts from other free rider prob-
lems where collective action is taken by an association with consequent
benefit not only to its membership but to non-members as well. Consider, for
example, the intervention of a ratepayers group before a government body
which succeeds in upsetting the adoption of a zoning by-law which would be
detrimental to the value of residential properties in the affected neighbour-
hood. Consider the even more diffuse benefits flowing from a persuasive
presentation of the Consumers' Association of Canada at, say, a Bell Canada
rate hearing before the C.R.T.C. One possible reason for denying a claim
brought by such an association against non-members on restitutionary grounds
would be that the benefits in question are not calculable by any meaningful
39 It is a reasonable assumption that the collective agreement negotiated with Local
71 would require employers such as Rivard with which it had apparently established
bargaining rights to employ only union labour to perform the functions performed by
members of Local 71.
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measure.40 In Rivard, such a measure has been established by practice within
the industry.
One final objection to the granting of restitutionary relief on the Rivard
facts could be premised on the absence of any reference in the statutory
scheme to contribution by non-members to the funding of employers' asso-
ciations. Should this be taken as evidence of legislative intent to deny
associations a remedy of this kind? Given that Canadian labour relations
legislation typically deals with a roughly analogous problem on the union side
by specifically permitting compulsory "check-off" of union dues in "agency
shop" or "Rand formula" provisions,41 is it not reasonable to interpret silence
from the legislature on this point as a legislative judgment that compulsory
contributions of this kind on the employer side are not warranted? It would
appear that Garrett J. was not pressed with an argument along these lines.
No reference is made to this problem in the Rivard judgment. Nonetheless,
it is an objection which warrants serious consideration.
As a point of departure, it may be observed that legislative silence in
itself would not normally be taken to be a very compelling indication that
the operation of general private law principles is being swept aside by a
statute. Admittedly, the relationship between private law restitutionary reme-
dies and statutory schemes does not appear to have been the subject of much
explicit discussion in the case law or the secondary literature. The relation-
ship between statute law and the principles of liability of tort and contract,
of course, is a more familiar subject of analysis. Contracts, arguably, is the
more fruitful source of analogy. The heart of the problem in the restitutionary
context is similar to that which arises in contract cases: should a cause of
action which would otherwise arise at common law be allowed to subsist in
the face of these particular statutory schemes? The analysis adopted in the
4 0 See supra note 1, at 575. This is not to say, of course, that the value of the inter-
ventions of organizations such as the Consumers' Association ought not be considered
to provide a rationale for adopting other means of financing them (e.g., by direct sub-
sidy or costs awards in regulatory proceedings) which will indirectly require "free-
riders" to contribute to their cost. See Trebilcock, Winners and Losers in the Modern
Regulatory System, Must the Consumer Always Lose? (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J.
619; Cons. Ass'n of Can., Costs Awards in Regulatory Proceedings; A Manual for Pub-
lic Participants (Ottawa: Cons. Ass'n Can., 1980).
41 See, e.g., The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 33(1) (a). The "Rand
formula" provisions find their antecedent in an arbitration award of Mr. Justice Rand in
which a compulsory check-off by the employer of union dues from the wages of all
employees within the bargaining unit was granted. The unfairness which would otherwise
result from permitting non-members of the union to gain a free-ride in the collective
bargaining process at the expense of dues-paying union members was relied on by Mr.
Justice Rand as a rationale for the award. See Ford Motor Co. of Can. Ltd. (1944),
46 C.L.L.C. 16,401.
As indicated above, supra note 21, the Pacquet case established that check-off pro-
visions were "conditions of employment" which could be the subject of "collective bar-
gaining" as these terms were defined in the Quebec Labour Relations Act. The express
authorization of such provisions in the Ontario statute was intended to clearly indicate that
such provisions did not contravene various provisions of the Act which secure certain
rights to employees to freely decide whether to become union members. See The Labour
Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, ss. 3, 58, 60.
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"illegal" contracts context appears to offer a useful analytical model. In
modem contract case law, the analysis begins from the assumption that pri-
vate law contractual remedies will continue to subsist unless legislative intent
to preclude their operation can be read into the scheme.4 In the absence of
a clear statement in the statute, the central question of legislative intent is
resolved by asking whether the objectives of the statutory scheme would be
frustrated or undermined by the undeterred operation of private law con-
tractual remedies. If no such harm results from contract enforcement, the
normal principles are allowed to operate. A similar analysis in the restitu-
tionary context would ask whether the operation of unjust enrichment reme-
dies would have a deleterious effect on the accomplishment of the policy
objectives of the statute. Where this is not the case, it would be presumed
that such remedies were to be available in accord with general principle.
In the present context, recognition of the availability of an unjust en-
richment remedy against non-members of employers' associations would not
in any respect undermine the effectiveness of the statutory accreditation
scheme. On the contrary, the recognition of such remedies would reduce the
disincentives which a firm such as Rivard may see in joining such associa-
tions. The restitutionary remedy does not completely remove such disin-
centives. It may well be more attractive to Rivard to remain outside the
Association and pay only a contribution to collective bargaining costs rather
than to join the Association and pay the full industry fund contribution. In
any event, even if the unjust enrichment remedy does not provide a complete
solution to the Association's funding concerns, it does remove the unfairness
of the non-members' free ride without in any respect undermining the opera-
tion of the accreditation provisions of the Labour Relations Act.
On the basis of general principle, then, we should conclude that any
restitutionary remedies available to the employer's association at common
law should subsist, unless the force of the Rand formula analogy is sufficient
to lead to the conclusion that the legislature, by its silence, must have in-
tended to deprive employers' associations of such remedies. Does the absence
of a Rand formula provision adapted to the needs of the employers' associa-
tions offer a convincing basis for inferring that restitutionary remedies are
precluded by the statute? There are a number of reasons for suggesting that
this conclusion is not warranted.
First, there is no necessary connection between the non-availability of
check-off rights and the non-availability of restitutionary remedies. The
former envisages the deduction of certain payments at source. The latter
envisages a cause of action enforceable by a direct suit against the unjustly
enriched party. Leaving aside political or public relations consideration ,
resort to litigation by unions on unjust enrichment grounds would not be a
practical means of securing contributions to the cost of their operations from
42 "A court should not hold that any contract or class of contracts is prohibited by
statute unless there is a clear implication, or 'necessary inference,' as Parke B. puts it,
that the statute so intended." St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B.
267 at 288, [1956] 3 All E.R. 633 at 690, [1956] 3 W.L.R. 870 at 881 per Devlin J.
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non-members. Check-off could not be accomplished at common law. Hence,
a legislative decision to withhold or deny check-off rights does not 9peak
directly to the availability of common law remedies. Moreover, there is no
practical equivalent in the employers' context to the use of check-off rights.
Under check-off, the union obtains the employers' cooperation in making
deductions at source. It is not impossible to conceive of roughly analogous
means of employing the co-operation of unions in coercing contributions
from non-member employers. For example, unions might be asked to supply
employees only to employers in good standing with the association. However,
a scheme which utilized union action as a device for securing contributions
from non-members of employer associations might well be considered unat-
tractive by employers or legislators. Further, the legality of such a device
may be open to question.43 In any event, it is not surprising that no such
policing function has been built into the accreditation scheme. Finally, it may
be observed that the general problem of integrating private law remedies with
statutory schemes raises questions of such subtlety that one might expect
these questions would often be simply left to the courts for judicial resolution
on the basis of general principle. This is no less true of restitutionary analysis
and it will often be appropriate-and, arguably, is appropriate here-to
conclude that legislative silence signals only that the matter has not been
addressed by the legislature.
It may be argued, however, that in the context of an elaborate and
detailed statutory scheme such as a labour relations law-the implementation
of which is supervised by an administrative body and the amendment of
which is not uncommon-the courts should be more willing than in other
contexts to infer from silence that the legislature intends that nothing be done
on the matter in question. Whatever the merits of this view, the intrusion of
the unjust enrichment principle into the Rivard fact situation is quite de-
fensible. In adopting a private law solution to the problem exemplified by
Rivard, Garrett J. has added only a rather minor and undisturbing footnote
to the labour relations scheme. The inability of the association to seek redress
in any other manner was presumably not anticipated by those who drafted
the accreditation scheme. Accordingly, invocation of the unjust enrichment
43 "Combinations ... of workmen or employees for their own reasonable protection
as such workmen or employees" are exempt from federal anti-combines law. See
Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 4 as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c.
76, s. 2. The issue here is whether action to further the interests of an employers'
association would be protected by this provision. An argument favouring the legality of
these arrangements would be that the desire of the union to place support of the em-
ployers association on the bargaining table constitutes a legitimate exercise in seeking
favourable trade-offs with the association. Moreover, if the Pacquet analogy, supra note
21, is persuasive, the actions of the association in seeking such provisions may be
protected by s. 41(1) (c) of the Act. So too, then, should union activity in support of
these objectives be protected. For a useful account of the impact of American and
Canadian anti-trust law on the reach of collective bargaining, see Backhouse, Labour
Unions and Anti-Combines Policy (1976), 14 Osgoode Hall L.J.
Consider, further, the applicability of s. 61 of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. 232: "No ... trade union ... shall seek by intimidation or coercion to compel
any person to become ... a member of ... an employers' organization. .... "
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principle may be seen to effect a useful, albeit partial, solution to a problem
resulting from an inadvertent lacuna in the statutory scheme.
In summary, the fact situation exemplified by Rivard offers another con-
text within which a strong argument can be made in support of restitutionary
recovery for the self-serving intermeddler. Although the analysis put forward
by Garrett J. in the Rivard judgment does not withstand critical scrutiny, the
result in the case can be supported on the basis of modem restitutionary
analysis. An implication of this analysis of interest to the construction indus-
try is that it would appear to provide a basis for imposing a more general
duty on contractors who do not join employers' associations to contribute
to the costs incurred by such associations in their bargaining activities than
was envisaged by Garrett J. in Rivard. The fact that an association has been
accredited under provincial labour relations legislation should be taken to
establish that the association's representation of non-members is unofficious.
The use of union workers by non-member employers will provide a basis for
holding that a benefit has been conferred. The industry fund provisions
developed by the industry point to an acceptable method of measuring the
extent of the benefit conferred on a particular contractor which should
facilitate the calculation of an appropriate restitutionary award.

